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1. Introduction 
Corruption undermines the strength of public institutions and hampers economic growth 
and development (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, Mauro 1995, Shleifer 1997, Bardhan 1997, Meon 
and Sekkat 2005).  The cost of corruption is particularly high in developing and transition 
countries where bribery is endemic (EBRD 2005, Transparency International 2005).  Yet 
available estimates of bribery are imprecise, sporadic and apply to highly specific cases.  Popular 
perception-based indices are ordinal and subjective and while informative they do not provide a 
reliable quantitative estimate of bribery.  
In this paper we develop a novel framework to estimate the extent of bribery in the public 
sector using micro-level data on observable labor market outcomes, household spending, and 
asset holdings.  Specifically, we estimate the residual wage differentials between the public and 
private sectors, compare these differentials with the sectoral differences in household 
expenditures and asset holdings, and then use the conditions of labor market equilibrium to 
compute a measure of unobserved non-taxable compensation (i.e., bribery) at the aggregate level.   
We motivate our analysis by observing conflicting evidence from developed countries 
and several transition economies with respect to the private-public wage differentials.  In a 
review of public sector pay in several developed countries, Gregory and Borland (1999) 
conclude that public sector employees generally receive higher average earnings than private 
sector employees.  However, a few recent studies from transition countries find the opposite 
result, with public sector employees receiving much lower wages than their private sector 
counterparts (Adamchik and Bedi (2000) in Poland, Brainerd (2002) in Russia, and Lokshin and 
Jovanovic (2003) in Yugoslavia).   
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Using recently collected data from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, we 
also find that public sector employees in Ukraine are significantly underpaid compared to 
workers in the other sectors.  The wage gap between private and public firms is surprisingly 
large (24 to 32% conditional on worker characteristics) and remarkably stable over recent years 
(1997-2003).  We examine the wage gap at different points of the conditional wage distribution 
and establish that average results understate the gap at the top and overstate it at the bottom of 
the distribution.  We show that the wage gap is largest (can exceed 60%) among the most 
productive and highly paid workers.  Using the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition of 
changes in wage distribution, we find little contribution of differences in worker characteristics 
to explaining the wage gap and attribute most of the wage difference to the returns to (or prices 
of) these characteristics.  At the same time, public and private sectors exhibit very similar rates 
of voluntary separations, labor mobility across sectors is non-trivial, the flows in and out of the 
public sector are approximately the same, and the size of the public sector remains virtually 
unchanged over the 7 years of our data.  This brings about an important question of why public 
sector employees on average and the most productive workers in particular continue working in 
the public sector despite their low rate of official pay.   
We argue that bribery is the most likely explanation for the observed wage differences.  
In particular, we show that the wage gap remains large after correcting for endogeneity, 
controlling for unobservable characteristics and accounting for differences in hours of work, 
union participation, job security, fringe benefits, bonuses, job satisfaction, and secondary 
employment.  More importantly, we show that the levels of consumer expenditures and asset 
holdings are essentially identical for workers in the public and private sectors.  This finding 
indicates unequivocally the presence of additional non-reported monetary compensation that 
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allows employees in the public and private sectors to enjoy similar levels of consumption.  We 
refer to this unobserved compensation in the public sector as a bribe. 
The bribery explanation of the wage gap is consistent with a study of 31 developing 
countries that finds a robust negative relationship between aggregate corruption indices and 
relative civil-service pay at the country level (van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001).  This 
explanation is also consistent with numerous media reports and surveys that portray widespread 
bribery in the Ukrainian public sector.  For example, according to the 2002 national survey of 
corruption in Ukraine, 78% of the respondents believe that all or almost all government officials 
accept bribes, 44% indicate that they paid bribes or made gifts in one form or another at least 
once during the last year (Woronowycz 2003).1 
We estimate the extent of bribery at the national level by using the method of equalizing 
sectoral differences.  There are two underlying assumptions of our method: (1) there is no 
bribery in the private sector and (2) there are no queues in the public sector.  If any of these 
assumptions does not hold, we underestimate the magnitude of bribery.  Using our best estimates 
of the residual private-public wage gap, we find that bribery accounts for at least 20% of the total 
wage compensation in the public sector in Ukraine, which is equivalent to 460-580 million U.S. 
dollars or 0.9-1.2% of Ukraine’s GDP in 2003.  Our alternative estimates suggest that the amount 
of bribery could be as high as 750 million U.S. dollars in 2003. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we introduce our data and descriptive 
statistics.  In Section 3 we present the estimates of the average private-public wage gap and 
check their robustness.  In Section 4 we look at the wage gap between private and public firms at 
different points in the wage distribution and examine the factors contributing to the wage gap 
                                                 
1 According to the same survey, 73% of the respondents indicated they had offered money to medical workers, 25% 
paid traffic police, 24% paid teachers and professors, 23% claimed they had illegally compensated government 
communal service workers (Woronowycz 2003). 
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using the Machado-Mata quantile decomposition.  In Section 5 we explore the factors that might 
explain the trends established in Sections 3 and 4.  We present the methodology and the 
estimates of bribery in Ukraine in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7. 
2. Data and Sample 
The data for this study are drawn from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(ULMS) which is based on a stratified, random, and nationally representative sample of 4,096 
households.  8,641 individuals of age 15-72 participated in the Ukrainian survey in 2003.  The 
response rate was 66% for households and 87% for individuals within the households.  Although 
ULMS started only in 2003, it collected employment histories for 1986, 1991, and continuously 
from 1997 to 2003.  In this paper we do not use the 1986 data because no respondent reports a 
private job for this year.     
The ULMS contains rich information on household and individual characteristics such as 
household expenditures and asset holdings, individual earnings, hours of work, education, 
demographics, job tenure, union membership, quits and layoffs, parents’ occupation and 
education, and characteristics of the primary employer such as sector, location, size, and fringe 
benefits. The definitions of all variables used in the empirical analysis are provided in Appendix 
Table A1.   
The key variable in our analysis is the log of monthly contractual (accrued) wage after 
taxes at the primary job.  We refer readers to Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005) for a 
discussion of the advantages and shortcomings of this measure and also for the effect of a recall 
bias on the wage measure in the ULMS.  Ideally, we would like to use an hourly wage rate to 
control for sectoral differences in hours of work.  However, we can create such a variable only 
for 2003 by dividing monthly wage by monthly hours of work at the primary job (calculated as 
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average weekly hours times 4.2).  In all other years, the differences in hours are partially 
controlled by including a dummy variable for a full-time job.   
To reduce the potential effect of mortality-related sample attrition in a retrospective 
survey, the sample is restricted to the prime age group 15-59.2  Following the literature (e.g., 
Borjas 2002), we exclude the self-employed from the analysis of the private-public wage gap.  
We also leave out worker collectives (cooperatives and agricultural farms) because their wage 
determination process is different from other private firms.  These criteria produce the sample of 
wage earners that ranges from 2,320 in 1998 to 2,893 people in 1991 (see Table 1).   
We distinguish between the private sector and the two segments of the state sector – 
budgetary organizations and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and define the public sector as 
comprised of budgetary organizations.3  These are non-profit organizations that are financed by 
and fully accountable to the government, highly regulated, forced to pay according to the wage 
grid, and significantly influenced by the political environment.  They typically provide direct 
services to the population, and hence employees of these organizations may receive unofficial 
additional payments from customers for their services.  The major categories of budgetary 
organizations are public administration, schools, and health care institutions.  In contrast, SOEs 
are mostly profit-driven institutions that are self-financed through their own activities and 
managed by appointed directors who are given significant freedom in decision making.  They 
often operate in concentrated or heavily regulated industries such as natural resources, 
transportation, communications, the military industrial complex, and utilities.  Wage payment 
                                                 
2 For the Soviet period of our data (1991) we employ sample weights that are constructed on the basis of the USSR 
Census 1989, with under-represented groups receiving larger weights.  See Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005) 
for further details. 
3  The private sector is also not homogeneous and includes newly created private firms and privatized former SOEs.  
Although privatized firms are found to resemble SOEs in their (in)efficiency (Sabirianova, Svejnar, and Terrell 
2005), they are closer to new private firms in wage setting behavior.  We decided to keep a broad definition of the 
private sector in order to draw more general conclusions about the private-public wage gap and to compare our 
results to other studies.   
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according to the wage grid is recommended, but not strictly enforced in SOEs.  Despite these 
differences, SOEs and public organizations are very similar in many characteristics, including 
hours of work, fringe benefits, union participation, labor force composition, organizational 
norms, morale, etc.  Therefore, working in SOEs might be a better counterfactual alternative for 
a public sector employee than working in the private sector (see Section 5 for further discussion).  
Sectoral evolution of employment from 1991 to 2003 is reported in Appendix Table A2. 
The share of SOE employment in our sample continuously declined from 79.6% in 1991 to 
36.8% in 2003.  In contrast, the private sector share increased from 1.3% in 1991 to 41.4% in 
2003.  The growth of the private sector continued throughout the whole transition period − its 
size increased by almost 64% from 1997 to 2002, which can be explained by large-scale 
privatization of state enterprises and by the entry of new private firms.  In the meantime, the 
share of public sector employment remained relatively unchanged over the last 12 years and 
stayed at 19-22%. 
We also report the gender breakdown of the sectoral employment shares and notice that 
the share of public sector employment is much larger for females than for males (31.3% vs. 
10.6% in 2003).  Because of these highly significant gender differences in public sector 
participation, the summary statistics of the key variables are also reported by gender (see 
Appendix Table A3).  On average, the public sector employees (both males and females) are 
more educated than employees in state-owned and private firms.  However with respect to other 
characteristics (except for the firm size), the public sector and SOEs display very strong 
similarities.  Compared to the private sector, the other two sectors have longer work experience 
and tenure, shorter hours of work, and higher union participation.  Another important distinction 
between the private sector and the two state sectors are gender differences in mean 
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characteristics.  While in the private sector the gender differences in all characteristics, except for 
education, are not statistically significant, in both state sectors females predictably stay longer at 
the same enterprise, have higher union involvement, and work fewer hours.   
3. Private-Public Wage Gap 
In this section, we document the evolution of the private-public wage gap in Ukraine and 
present various estimates of the gap, with a special emphasis on treating the endogeneity bias due 
to omitted variables and self-selection. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the unconditional private-public wage gap in 
Ukraine for all workers, and separately by gender.  The gap is measured as a mean difference in 
log of monthly wage between the sectors.  Evidently, SOEs and private firms pay a noticeable 
wage premium relative to public organizations for both males and females.  The average gap in 
2003 was about 0.3 log points (33-36%).  This finding is consistent with the positive private 
sector wage premium (as compared to the entire state sector) found in several other transition 
countries (e.g., Brainerd (2002) in Russia and Lokshin and Jovanovic (2003) in Yugoslavia), but 
it contrasts with the negative gap observed in developed countries.4 
After controlling for the observable characteristics of workers, the conditional private-
public wage gap often reduces in absolute terms but remains negative and significant for females 
and sometimes takes on zero or a small positive value for males (Mueller, 1998, Poterba and 
Rueben, 1994).  Following the literature, we estimate the conditional gap from the wage equation 
for each year and gender: 
                                                 
4 For example, the mean difference in log of hourly wage between the private and public sectors is estimated to be -
0.086 for males and -0.236 for females in UK in 1986 (Bender, 2003); -0.114 for both genders in Netherlands in 
1986 (van Ophem, 1993); -0.225 for males and -0.336 for females in Canada in 1990 (Prescott and Wandschneider, 
1999); -0.009 for males and -0.165 for females in Germany in 1984-1996 (Jurges, 2002); and -0.060 for males and -
0.200 for females in Germany in 2000 (Melly, 2005), among many other studies. 
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itititit XSw εγβ ++=ln , (1) 
where wit is after-tax monthly contractual wage, Sit is a set of indicators for working in SOEs or 
the private sector; Xit is a vector of individual characteristics such as years of schooling, a gender 
dummy, experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, a dummy for full-time job, 
seven categories of firm size, and five categories of location; and εit is the error term.5  Table 2 
shows the private-public wage gap ( βˆ ) from Equation (1) estimated for each year separately.  
The estimated conditional wage gap remains large in economic and statistical levels and does not 
show any sign of a decline from 1997 to 2003.6     
In Table 3, we provide the estimates of the wage gap for the 1997-2003 pooled sample.  
Private firms pay significantly higher wage than public organizations, with their conditional 
wage premium of 0.249 log points during the 1997-2003 period (see Panel A).  The SOE-public 
wage gap is also large and highly significant (0.153 log points).  Estimates in Panel B confirm 
that sectoral wage differences are not diminishing over time.  It is interesting that the conditional 
private-public wage gap is noticeably higher for females than for males (0.310 vs. 0.186 log 
points), whereas we know from previous research in developed countries that females usually 
enjoy a bigger wage premium in the public sector, with or without conditioning on worker 
characteristics (Borjas 2002, Prescott and Wandschneider 1999). 
Our OLS estimates may be biased due to omitted variables and endogenous self-selection 
to the public sector.  Among the “usual suspects” of omitted factors are individual abilities, 
                                                 
5 The choice of individual covariates is quite standard.  Industry dummies are not included because they are 
perfectly nested within the sectors.  We are aware of a current debate whether it is appropriate to include the firm 
size variable (Gregory and Borland 1999).  We include the firm size in order to control partially for the 
unobservable differences in non-labor compensation and job security.  Without this variable, the SOE-public gap 
increases by 0.03 log points while the private-public gap remains unaffected.  
6 The colossal private sector wage premium in 1991 (0.482 log points or 62%) might seem somewhat inconsistent 
with the rest of time-series.  We note that the private sector virtually did not exist at that time (1.3% of non-farm 
employment) and the premium may simply reflect a first mover advantage for very few risk takers.  For that reason 
we exclude the 1991 data from the subsequent panel analysis and focus on the more mature transition period. 
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preferences, family or neighborhood influence, etc.  The most obvious solution to this problem is 
to add omitted variables or their proxies into a wage equation.  Cross-sectional data could offer a 
partial treatment because of the limited number of available proxies such as test scores, parental 
background, number of children, place of residence, etc.  Fixed effect estimates are superior in 
that they control for all time-invariant omitted variables that might affect both wage and sectoral 
choice. 
In Table 3, column OLS(2), we report the conditional private-public wage gap estimated 
from the wage equation that includes all covariates from OLS(1) plus marital status, number of 
children, and several variables for family background − five categories of occupations and years 
of schooling of both parents.  In Table 3 we also show the fixed effect (FE) estimates of the gap 
from Equation (2):7  
itiititit uXSw +++= αγβln ,  (2) 
where αi are individual fixed effects. 
Both OLS(2) and FE estimates indicate that the private-public wage gap is economically 
large, statistically significant, and not diminishing over time.  The gap estimated with controls 
for children and family background is not statistically different from its original OLS estimate at 
the 5% level of significance.  Furthermore, the estimated gap for males is hardly influenced by 
fixed effects, while the gap for females falls in FE compared to its original OLS estimate (from 
0.310 to 0.204 log points).  This suggests that endogenous sorting into the public sector might be 
more important for females than for males.  
                                                 
7 In Table 3, panel C, we also report the random effect (RE) and first-differencing (FD) estimates of the wage gap 
but note that the RE estimate can not be considered as unbiased by virtue of our assumption that αi influence 
sectoral choice, i.e., 0),( ≠iitSE α .  Both RE and FD estimates of the gap are close to the OLS estimate.   
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Alternatively, we can address the endogeneity bias by using instrumental variables or 
switching regression models.  These methods, however, require an exclusion restriction that 
affects strongly the choice of the sector and that is not correlated with the wage equation error 
term.  As past extensive empirical work revealed, finding proper exclusion restrictions that 
satisfy both criteria is an extremely hard task.8  In addition, the existing methods correcting for 
selectivity bias can be very non-robust when the hazard of being selected into the public sector is 
collinear with the wage equation regressors (Leung and Yu 1996, Puhani 2000).  Having 
experimented with a number of variables (such as age, education categories, marital status, 
number of children ever born, number of children less than 18 years old, parents’ occupation, 
household income, and employment in pre-reform period), we conclude that the wage gap 
estimates corrected for self-selection are extremely sensitive to the choice of exclusion 
restrictions and thus not credible (see Appendix Table A4).9 
We note, however, that most of the potentially valid exclusion restrictions are time-
invariant (or hardly change over time) and, therefore, these alternatives are not superior to the 
fixed effect specification.  The FE estimates could be criticized for treating only the time-
invariant portion of the endogeneity bias while preferences for a particular sector may change 
over time.  To capture this possible time-varying endogeneity, we estimate an individual trend 
model that allows individual unobserved factors to have their own time trend: 
ln it it it i i itw S X t uβ γ α δ= + + + + . (3) 
                                                 
8 Some of the earlier used restrictions were rejected later because of their obvious correlation with εit (e.g., age, 
education categories, and marital status).  With respect to some other variables (such as parents’ occupation, parents’ 
schooling, number of children, and household income), a debate continues whether they belong to the wage equation 
or to the sectoral choice equation.  Children and household income could be endogenous if the after-tax wage is 
observed (Puhani 2000); parental education could be endogenous if it is correlated with child ability (Wooldridge 
2002, p.87).  Several plausible exclusion restrictions are proposed for the countries that experienced an exogenous 
structural shock.  For example, Jovanovic and Lokshin (2004) use the industry of pre-reform employment in Russia 
and Falaris (2003) uses land restitution in Bulgaria. 
9 Industry of employment in 1991 is the only restriction variable that generates the gap estimate more or less 
consistent with OLS and FE estimates. 
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We first eliminate the constant individual effect αi by first-differencing transformation of all 
variables, and then we apply the fixed effects transformation to Equation (4) in order to eliminate 
the individual-specific trend δi:10 
ln it it it i itw S X uβ γ δΔ = Δ + Δ + + Δ . (4) 
We note that such a transformation, while treating endogeneity, can generate several 
problems.  First, it might lead to the attenuation bias due to an increased noise-to-signal ratio, 
especially when the number of people who switch sectors is small.  This is less of a problem in 
our data since the number of people changing sectors is non-trivial.  Among those employed in 
the public sector in 1997, 63% continued working in this sector during next six years, while the 
remaining 37% left the sector either temporary or permanently.  If we take only employees in our 
three sectors, about 12% of them switched sectors directly (without a break for non-employment 
or self-employment) at least once during the 1997-2003 period.  We report the annual rates of 
entry to and exit from the public sector in Table 4.  Second, applying FE to a first-differenced 
equation tends to magnify standard errors due to a smaller sample size, reduced variation in 
regressors, and increased variation of the error term.  Despite these problems, the individual 
trend estimate of the private-public wage gap is large in magnitude (0.279 log points) and 
statistically significant (Table 3, Panel C).  
In summary, all panel data estimates of the gap appear to be very close to the baseline 
OLS estimates and indicate that public sector employees are significantly underpaid compared to 
employees in SOEs and private firms, with an estimated conditional wage loss varying from 
0.214 to 0.279 log points relative to private sector wages and from 0.125 to 0.165 log points 
relative to SOEs wages. 
                                                 
10 The FE estimator is more efficient than the second differencing estimator under the assumption that Δuit are 
serially uncorrelated. 
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4. Distribution of the Private-Public Wage Gap 
In this section, we examine the private-public wage gap at different percentiles of 
conditional wage distribution.  We estimate a series of quantile regressions to form the 
distribution of the private-public wage gap: 
(ln | , )it it it it itQ w S X S Xθ θ θβ γ= + , (5) 
where Qθ is the θth percentile of lnwit conditional on the covariates S and X specified in OLS(1).11  
The estimated coefficients βθ  give the conditional wage gap at the θth percentile.  The 
distribution of these coefficients is depicted in Figure 1.  
Quantile regressions produce two important results.  First, public sector employees 
receive lower wages than private sector employees at all percentiles of the conditional wage 
distribution.  Second, the wage gap between the private and public sectors is largest among the 
most productive workers.   
Virtually all studies that use quantile regression methods find an upward sloping private-
public wage gap (e.g., Hyder and Reilly (2005) for Pakistan, Melly (2005) for Germany, Mueller 
(1998) for Canada, Nielsen and Rosholm (2001) for Zambia, and Poterba and Rueben (1994) for 
United States), and according to our findings, Ukraine is no exception.  It is common to find that 
the upper tail of the wage distribution loses the most (or gains the least) while working in the 
public sector.  What is different in Ukraine is a non-negative intercept, meaning that all workers 
are being paid less when working in the public sector. 
It is also interesting that for Ukraine the wage gap is much steeper for females than for 
males.  The private-public wage gap for female employees steadily grows with their productivity 
                                                 
11 We use the set of covariates specified in OLS(1) because including additional covariates from OLS(2) reduces the 
sample size significantly and the OLS(1) specification makes our estimates more comparable to other studies given 
that family background and children variables are not easily available in many surveys.  As discussed in Section 3, 
the additional covariates do not have a statistically significant effect on the estimated wage gap. 
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from 11% in the 10th percentile to 67.5% in the 90th percentile.  For males, the wage gap 
increases only slightly with percentiles and, for the most part of the distribution, it remains 
relatively flat at the level of 15-20%.  
We use the Machado and Mata (2005) quantile method to decompose the measured wage 
gap into components due to the differences in prices of worker characteristics and the differences 
in observed characteristics.12  This method involves making B (we chose B=10,000) independent 
random draws of percentiles θ from [0,1] and estimating B quantile regressions 
(ln )S S S SQ w X Xθ θγ=  for each randomly drawn percentile θ and for each sector S={PRI,PUB}, 
separately.  The coefficients 1 1{ } ,{ }
PRI B PUB B
i i i iβ β= =  can be interpreted as prices for observable 
characteristics of workers.  We also create a random sample of size B from covariates X for each 
sector and denote generated samples as 1 1{ } ,{ }
PRI B PUB B









, }{}{ == = β , where K and M denote various combinations of sectors 
{PRI, PUB}.  For example Bi
PUBPUBw 1




, }{ =  indicates counterfactual wage distribution for public sector employees if their 
observed characteristics were rewarded as in the private sector. 
Using the generated sequences of slopes and observed characteristics, we compute the 
private sector wage premium at k=1…99 percentiles of the constructed wage distributions.  
Figure 2 depicts four distributions of the private-public wage gap:  the actual wage gap 
distribution , ,(ln ) (ln )PRI PRI PUB PUBk kQ w Q w− ; a counterfactual distribution (1) that shows how 
much a private sector employee would gain (lose) if he/she were to move to the public sector 
, ,(ln ) (ln )PRI PRI PUB PRIk kQ w Q w− ; a counterfactual  distribution (2) that shows how much a public 
                                                 
12 Melly (2005) uses the same method in the analysis of the private-public wage gap in Germany. 
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sector employee would gain (lose) if he/she were to move to the private sector 
, ,(ln ) (ln )PRI PUB PUB PUBk kQ w Q w− ; and a counterfactual distribution (3)  that shows the wage 
differences between a private sector employee and a public sector employee if the latter had 
betas from the private sector , ,(ln ) (ln )PRI PRI PRI PUBk kQ w Q w− .   
The counterfactual wage gap (3) is uniformly distributed around zero at nearly all 
percentiles, meaning that if the characteristics of the public sector workers were rewarded as in 
the private sector, the wage gap would be almost zero.  This suggests that sectoral differences in 
observable characteristics contribute little to the sectoral differences in wages.  At the same time, 
both counterfactual wage gaps (1) and (2) are close to the actual wage gap.  Thus, the magnitude 
and the distributional shape of the wage gap are largely determined by the differences in prices 
of worker characteristics.   
In the following section, we explore further why the same observable characteristics are 
rewarded so differently in each of the three sectors.  
5. Determinants of the Private-Public Wage Gap 
To this point of our analysis, we have established three important patterns in sectoral 
wage differentials in Ukraine: i) the private-public wage gap is positive and economically 
significant; ii) the gap is not diminishing over time; and iii) the gap is largest among the most 
productive workers.  This section investigates the factors that might explain these patterns. 
Previous studies focused on explanations of the opposite phenomenon, that is, why a 
public sector employee earns a rent (i.e., positive wage premium conditional on worker 
characteristics).  The most common answer is the specificity of the public sector, namely, its 
different objective function (not profit maximization) and soft budget constraints, inelastic 
demand for public services, difficult monitoring of public sector services, and a higher rate of 
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unionization and hence stronger bargaining position to secure a higher wage (Mueller 2000).  
Most of these explanations cannot be tested with our data, except for the union effect.  But if any 
of them were relevant for Ukraine, then the size of the private-public gap would be even bigger 
than the estimates reported in Section 3. 
With respect to unions, previous studies generally find positive effects of union 
participation on wages of government employees (see Gregory and Borland (1999) for a survey 
of studies).  Table A3 shows very high union density in the public sector and SOEs in Ukraine 
(91.9% and 85.9% for females and 80.8% and 73.8% for males), which is significantly bigger 
than union participation in the private sector (46.8% for females and 47.6% for males).  
According to Blanchflower (1996), among 15 OECD countries only Finland and Sweden have 
higher union participation in the public sector.  Therefore, if the union wage premium exists in 
Ukraine, then our gap measure would be underestimated.  We test this hypothesis by including a 
dummy for union membership in Equation (1) for 2003 and find no statistically significant 
differences in wages associated with union membership.  This is not surprising given the weak 
bargaining power of the unions inherited from the old socialist system, in which they have 
partnered with enterprise administration in distributing social benefits among employees.  Table 
5 shows that the conditional private-public wage gap hardly changes after controlling for union 
participation. 
Now we turn to the factors that may explain why a public sector employee earns less than 
an equivalent employee in the private sector, which is more pertinent to our case.  In particular, 
we focus on wage control in an inflationary environment, differences in hours of work, higher 
non-labor compensation and job security in the public sector, job satisfaction, bonuses, multiple 
job holding, and bribery. 
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5.1. Government Wage Control  
 Wages in the public sector in Ukraine are paid according to a government-regulated wage 
grid.  In an inflationary economy such as Ukraine, delayed revisions of the wage grid might 
result in lower wages in the public sector.  It could have been an important issue during the early 
1990s when Ukraine experienced a hyperinflation of three to four digits, reaching the 4735% 
level in 1993.  After 1996, inflation was relatively mild and fluctuated from 28.2% in 2000 to 
0.8% in 2002.  During the 1997-2003 period, the government implemented eight revisions of the 
wage grid level in the public sector, yet the gap remained large.  More importantly, the fact that 
public employees are constantly underpaid due to delayed and imperfect adjustments in the wage 
grid does not explain why we do not observe higher quit rates in the public sector, as Tables 8 
and 9 show.   
5.2.  Hours of Work 
 As we see from the descriptive statistics in Table A3, a public sector employee, on 
average, works fewer hours per week than a private sector employee, with a 3-hour difference 
for males and a 7-hour difference for females.  It may not be sufficient to simply control for a 
full-time job as we did it in our previous estimates.  It is predictable that the estimated wage gap 
is likely to decline if we were to use hourly wages instead of monthly wages.  For 2003, we can 
test how sensitive our gap estimates to hourly wages are by using OLS and quantile regressions.  
 We report our results in Table 5 and Figure 3.  To reduce the influence of outliers and a 
measurement error, we include only respondents who earn more than two thirds of a minimum 
hourly wage (≈0.734 UAH).  Using hourly wage rate as a dependent variable in Equation (1) 
reduces the size of the SOE-public wage gap by only 0.036 log points while the private-public 
gap falls from 0.287 to 0.193 log points.  As a side note, Table 5 also shows that restricting our 
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sample to full-time employees does not make any difference for the reduction in the size of the 
gap.  The most interesting finding from the quantile regressions (depicted on Figure 3) is that 
with an hourly wage rate on the left-hand side the private-SOE gap almost disappears while the 
SOE-public gap remains the same at nearly all percentiles of conditional wage distribution.  An 
important implication of this finding is that in the absence of hours of work variable the SOE-
public gap can be used as an approximate measure of the private-public gap.  
 Despite a sizeable drop in the private-public wage gap in an hourly wage specification, 
the gap still remains large and positive, exceeding a 20% level for the upper half earners.  Hence 
there is a significant upward sloping wage gap that needs to be explained. 
5.3. Fringe Benefits 
 It has been noted by many authors that fringe benefits may compensate lower wages 
(e.g., Olson 2002, Vella 1993).  In Ukraine, public sector employees enjoy far more generous 
fringe benefits than their counterparts in the private sector (see Table 6).  Compared to private 
firms, public organizations are more likely to provide their employees with additional medical 
services, free child care, vacation travel, housing subsidies, and enterprise-paid training.  It is 
plausible to hypothesize that total labor compensation (wages plus fringe benefits) should be 
equalized between the sectors.   
However, two striking facts invalidate this hypothesis.  First, there are almost no 
differences in fringe benefits provision between the public sectors and SOEs and in some 
instances more workers receive benefits in SOEs than in public organizations (e.g., health 
coverage and transportation subsidies).  Consequently, fringe benefits cannot explain the 
observed wage differences between the two state sectors.  Second, the distribution of fringe 
benefits across the percentiles of conditional wage is practically flat in all sectors, as depicted in 
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Figure 4 for the selected benefits.  The flat distribution of fringe benefits does not support the 
upward sloping private-public gap.  Even if we assume that fringe benefits account for the wage 
differences between SOEs and private firms, a significant portion of the private-public gap, 
particularly for the most productive workers, remains unexplained. 
5.4. Job Security and Risk Aversion 
Job security is another important factor that enters into a tradeoff with wage.  Public 
sector employees may accept lower wages in exchange for higher job security.  We can 
approximate individual job security by the probability of layoffs and also by the degree of wage 
volatility.   
Table 7 and Figure 5 report a lower probability of layoffs in the public sector than in the 
other two sectors on average and across the wage distribution.  Figure 5 also shows fewer job 
separations in the top deciles of the conditional wage distribution relative to the bottom deciles, 
which is in accordance with the upward sloping private-public wage gap.  However, the 
differences in the probability of involuntary separations are not sufficiently large to 
counterbalance differences in wages.  To show this, we first estimate a probit model and obtain 
the sectoral differences in the probability of being laid off in year t+1 conditional on worker 
characteristics in year t.  We control for the same characteristics as in Equation (1).  The 
marginal effects reported in Table 8 indicate that a public sector employee has a lower mean 
annual probability of being laid off by 0.034 (0.029) compared to a worker in the private sector 
(SOE) in 1997-2003.  Even if there were no layoffs in the public sector, in order to eliminate the 
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15-20% wage gap, the probability of layoff in the private sector should be at least 0.13-0.17, 
which is much greater than we observe in the data.13   
Indeed, we find the large gap in expected wages, which are computed as actual wages 
multiplied by one minus the predicted probability of being fired.  The distributions of the sectoral 
gap in expected monthly wage (1997-2003) and expected hourly wage (2003) are depicted in 
Figure 6, which is analogous to Figure 3.  In Table 5, we report the OLS estimate of the gap in 
expected hourly wages for 2003.  The OLS and quantile estimates suggest that the conditional 
wage gap falls slightly (by 0.015 log points on average) after controlling for the probability of 
being laid off. 
The volatility of wages is another important dimension of job security.  Table 9 contains 
the standard deviation of log of monthly wage and 90-10 wage differentials.  Both measures 
indicate that wages are more compressed in the public sector than in the private sector.  Public 
sector workers, therefore, might accept lower wage in exchange for its lower volatility.  
However, simple calculations show that reasonable values of worker’s risk aversion cannot 
match the existing gap.  
To parameterize the trade-off between the mean and the variance of compensation, 
suppose that the utility function is isoelastic and that all compensation come from wages, i.e., 
1( 1) /(1 )U C γ γ−= − − , where C is consumption and γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  
Chetty (forthcoming) and Kaplow (2005) argue that the upper bound of γ is not greater than 1.5.  
Using this upper-bound estimate of risk aversion (γ  = 1.5), we can compute the maximum wage 
gap that would compensate for the observed differences in wage dispersion between the public 
and private sectors.  Specifically, the maximum wage gap explained by risk aversion is equal to 
                                                 
13 These calculations are made by assuming risk-neutrality and equalizing expected wages in two sectors wb(1-
ρb)=wp(1-ρp), where ρb and ρp are the probabilities of being laid off from the public and private sectors, respectively.  
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2 ( )PRI PUB
γ σ σ− .14  By equalizing expected utility across the sectors, we obtain that the difference 
in wage dispersion (measured as standard deviation of the log of real wages) could reduce the 
private-public wage gap by at most 3.5 percentage points.  Because SOEs and public 
organizations have the same degree of wage dispersion, the differences in risk aversion cannot 
explain the wage gap between these two sectors.  Furthermore, the compensating wage 
differentials associated with the difference in the variation of wages practically vanish when we 
use the inter-temporal variation that is approximated by the standard deviation of the residuals 
estimated from Equation (2) with individual and year fixed effects (Table 9).   
5.5. Job Satisfaction, Bonuses, and Multiple Job Holding 
We also check a few other factors that could potentially increase worker’s utility 
(compensation) and hence be traded for lower wage.  For instance, it might be that public sector 
employees accept lower wages because of higher moral satisfaction they derive from their job.  
However, employees in the public and private sectors are ceteris paribus equally satisfied with 
their jobs, and together they are less satisfied than workers in SOEs (see Table 10).   
We also compare mean probabilities of receiving five types of bonuses across sectors 
using marginal effects from the probit model shown in Table 10.  37.1% of the sample report 
getting a bonus last year, although the exact bonus amount is unknown.  In most specifications, 
cross-sectoral differences in probabilities of getting bonuses are not statistically significant at the 
5% level, with an exception of a higher incidence of receiving a 13th salary and performance-
based bonuses in SOEs, and a higher probability of profit sharing in the private sector.  Based on 
                                                 
14 Given that the distribution of wages is approximately log-normal, the expected utility in sector x is  
2 21
2( ) (exp{(1 ) ln } 1) /(1 ) (exp{(1 ) (1 ) } 1) /(1 )x xE U E Cγ γ γ μ γ σ γ= − − − = − + − − − ,  
where μx is the mean of log wages and σx is the standard deviation of log wages.  
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these findings, adding bonus amounts to wages on the LHS is likely to increase the conditional 
private-public wage gap (or at least not to change it). 
Finally, we do not find any evidence that public sector employees have a higher 
probability of deriving additional income from secondary activities.  Table 10 demonstrates no 
statistically significant differences in secondary employment across all sectors.  The share of 
multiple job holders is so small (2.3% in 2003) that adding together wages from primary and 
secondary jobs has hardly any effect on the estimated sectoral wage gap. 
5.6. Expenditures and Assets 
Our analysis makes evident that cross-sectoral differences in fringe benefits, layoffs, 
wage volatility, job satisfaction, bonuses, and secondary employment explain only a small 
portion of the observed wage gap, and a significant part of the wage gap must be determined by 
other forces.  One can always argue that we ignore other unobservable job amenities that could 
possibly explain why public sector workers accept lower wages in exchange for these amenities 
(e.g., lower efforts, prestige, social status, etc.).  However in this case, as with any non-pecuniary 
job benefits, lower wage must translate into lower consumption expenditures.  In other words, 
the sectoral gap in consumer spending should be approximately equal to the gap in reported 
earnings unless public sector employees have unobservable, non-reported earnings.  We 
investigate below if this implication holds in our data. 
Because information on expenditures and assets is available at the household level, we 
aggregate our individual variables in Equation (1) to the household level and estimate the 
following base wage equation for the 2003 household data:  
0 1 2 3 4 5ln
SOE PRI OTH EAR HHM
h h h h h h h hw N N N N N Xβ β β β β β γ ε= + + + + + + + , (6) 
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where bars indicate that independent variables and errors are averaged across all wage earners in 





denote the number of household members employed in SOEs, private firms, and other sectors 
(collectives), respectively;15 EARhN  is the number of household wage earners; and
HHM
hN is the 
number of household members that controls for the number of dependants in the household, 
holding the number of wage earners constant.  Households with no wage earners are excluded 
from the analysis.   
We employ three definitions of labor compensation (wh):  household total of individual 
monthly contractual (accrued) wages at the primary job; total wages received last month by all 
household members at their primary jobs; and total earnings in the form of money, goods, and 
services received last month by all household members from their primary and secondary jobs.  
All wages and earnings are net of taxes.  As shown in Table 11, all three estimated household 
wage functions are consistent with our previous findings and indicate a significant wage gap 
between the public and non-public sectors.  A marginal increase in total household earnings 
when a member is employed in the private sector instead of being employed in the public sector 
is 0.166-0.171 (0.104-0.121 for SOEs) log points, ceteris paribus.  Sectoral differences in 
earnings are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Now we replace the dependent variable in Equation (6) with the measures of household 
expenditures and examine if there is a consumption gap across sectors.  Table 12 provides the 
consumption gap estimates for durables and nondurables, and separately for the different subsets 
of consumer nondurables such as food (food, beverages, and tobacco), services (transportation, 
                                                 
15 Coefficients are easier to interpret when we use the number of the employed household members instead of the 
employment shares.  For example, β1 shows a marginal increase in household earnings if a household member is 
employed in SOEs instead of being employed in a public organization.  To have a complete account for household 
earnings, we included workers in other sectors (collectives) in this part of the analysis. 
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health care, education, and entertainment), and non-durables less food.  Regardless of the 
measure, we do not find any significant differences in expenditures of workers in public 
organizations and SOEs.  Private sector workers spend 6.9% more on nondurables but this 
difference is consistent with private sector employees receiving about 5-10% more in wages than 
SOE workers.  Overall, the levels of expenditures are very similar across sectors. 
In principle, workers with different level of true earnings could have comparable levels of 
expenditures if, for example, private sector employees save more (consume less) because of their 
job and wage uncertainty.  Note that we focus on contractual wages rather than actual wages 
because contractual wages are less affected by transitory income shocks and thus can serve as a 
proxy for permanent income.  We have also shown that the sectoral differences in job uncertainty 
and wage volatility are so small (see Section 5.4) that they are unlikely to induce savings in the 
private sector sufficient to equalize expenditures.  Indeed, we find that households with workers 
in the private sector do not hold more assets (accumulated savings) than households with public 
sector workers.  Table 12 reports that employees in the private and public sectors have an 
essentially identical probability of possessing cars, phones, cell phones, and computers.  Hence 
the precautionary motives of workers cannot reconcile the sizeable sectoral gap in wages with 
the minor gap in expenditures and assets.  
5.7. Bribery 
Our findings clearly suggest that the sectoral differences in expenditures and asset 
holdings are considerably smaller than the sectoral differences in wages.  Thus, we cannot 
attribute the large private-public wage gap in Ukraine to the differences in non-pecuniary job 
amenities such as job security, fringe benefits, job satisfaction, efforts, etc.  The similar levels of 
consumer expenditures across sectors unambiguously indicate that public sector employees 
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receive unobserved monetary compensation that allows them to enjoy the level of consumption 
comparable to the consumption of workers in the other sectors.  We refer to this unobserved, 
non-reported compensation as a bribe.   
Numerous media reports and surveys indicate widespread bribery in the Ukrainian public 
sector (e.g., Woronowycz 2003).  Ukraine is at the bottom of the world distribution of the 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.  Among 146 surveyed countries in 
2004, Ukraine was ranked 122 (Transparency International 2005).  Pervasive bribery in Ukraine 
is consistent with the positive and time-invariant private-public wage gap.  It is also consistent 
with the observation that the gap is largest among the highly paid workers who may extort larger 
side payments because of either their high positions within the government hierarchy or ability to 
provide better services (e.g., high-quality physicians). 
6. Measuring Bribery 
In this section, we use the equalizing differences framework to obtain an estimate of 
bribery at the country level.  In a labor market with unconstrained entry and exit, equilibrium is 
achieved when the total worker compensation is equalized across sectors.  In this framework 
bribery, as with any other form of non-labor compensation, is going to be reflected in 
compensating wage differentials across sectors.  There are two underlying assumptions to this 
method: there is no bribery in the private sector and there are no queues in the public sector.  If 
private sector employees receive bribes (e.g. for utility repairs, phone installation, etc.), then our 
estimate of aggregate bribery is going to be understated.  If there are entry constraints in the 
public sector (in the form of queues or bribes to get a job in the public sector), then our bribery 
measure is also going to be understated because any additional investment in acquiring a job in 
the public sector will result in higher reservation wage, longer job tenure, and fewer quits in the 
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public sector.16  We find that voluntary turnover in the public sector is no less than in the other 
sectors, and tenure in public organizations is no longer than in SOEs (Tables 8, 9, and A3).  
Thus, entry constraints do not appear to be important in Ukraine. 
In our calculations we ignore general equilibrium effects, which, however, are likely to 
amplify the magnitude of bribery.  Since in equilibrium after-tax compensation in the public and 
private sectors is equalized, it must hold, ceteris paribus, that  
)1( β+= bp WW , (6) 
where Wb is average annual after-tax earnings in the public sector, Wp is annual after-tax earnings 
in the private sector, and β is the proportion of annual earnings received in the form of bribes by 
the average worker in the public sector.  
Thus, the total amount of bribes in the public sector (C) is equal to b bN W β , where Nb is 
the number of employees in the public sector.  The corresponding formula for the amount of 
bribes using the hourly wage rate is b b bN w h β , where wb is the average after-tax hourly wage in 
the public sector and hb is annual hours of work in the public sector. 
In these calculations it is assumed that the wage gap β  is the same for all workers. 
However, our quantile estimates suggest that the wage gap is increasing with the level of 
conditional wage.  We can account for this fact by weighting the estimated wage gap in each 





N h w θ θθ β== ∑C ,  (7) 
where θ is the θth percentile of the wage distribution. 
                                                 
16 Several studies indicate higher wages in the public sector in countries with relatively high corruption (Terrell 1993 
for Haiti and Nielsen and Rosholm 2001 for Zambia).  In these countries bribery is likely to appear on the quantity 
side in the form of queues or side payments to get a job in the public sector. 
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  Since β is not observed, we use the estimate of βˆ  from equations (1)-(5) to compute the 
proportion of annual earnings received in bribes as ˆ(exp( ) 1)β − .  Table 13 shows the aggregate 
measures of bribery in the public sector in 2003 for several alternative estimates of β.17 
The range of the estimated amount of bribes in the public sector is rather large – from 
1,662 mln UAH to 4,434 mln UAH.  As previous analysis indicated, some estimates are better 
than others.  Conditional wage gap estimates are superior to unconditional ones for the obvious 
reason of accounting for the differences in worker characteristics.  We are indifferent between 
the various panel data estimates because they are close to each other and distributed compactly 
around the pooled OLS estimate.  We prefer hourly wage over monthly wage since it allows us 
to control for the sectoral difference in hours of work.  We would choose expected hourly wage 
over actual hourly wage in order to account for the difference in job security.  The quantile 
estimates are superior to the OLS estimates in computing bribery because they give more 
weights to high earners who are likely to extract larger bribes.  We use both SOE-public and 
private-public gap measures to define the range of our preferred bribery estimates.18   
Based on our preferred wage gap estimates, the amount of bribery in the public sector in 
Ukraine equals 2,438–3,094 mln UAH (457-580 mln U.S. dollars), which translates into 0.9-
1.2% of GDP and 3.8-4.8% of the total wage bill in the economy.  This estimate is likely to be a 
lower bound because of potential bribery in the private sector, soft budget constraints in the 
public sector, non-profit objective function of public organizations, larger bonuses in SOEs and 
private firms, etc.  Even though this lower bound estimate is large, we believe it is entirely 
                                                 
17 To compute the amount of bribes, we use the following data for 2003: GDP=264,165 million UAH; Nb= 3,741 
million people, average before-tax monthly wage of the public sector employee =351 UAH; total wage bill = 64,966 
mln UAH; effective income tax rate (to compute after-tax monthly wage) =20.8% (State Statistics Committee of 
Ukraine 2003).   
18 SOEs and public organizations share a lot of similarities in terms of the variance of wages, hours of work, fringe 
benefits, union participation, and many other characteristics; and, for that reason, public employees might consider 
working in SOEs as a better alternative than working in the private sector. 
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plausible.  According to various estimates, the size of the shadow (unofficial) economy in 
Ukraine is at least 30% of GDP (Johnson et al 1997, Schneider and Enste 2000, Alexeev and 
Pyle 2003).  Suppose that the public sector employees extract bribes by allowing the activity of 
the shadow economy, then the effective tax rate on the shadow economy would be about 4% 
(=1.2% GDP in bribes divided by the size of the shadow economy (30% of GDP)).  In contrast, 
the tax burden on the official sector is much higher (the value added tax alone is 20%) and, thus, 
bribery can be a profitable mechanism of tax evasion.   
7. Conclusions 
Our analysis is the first to provide the systematic measure of bribery using micro-level 
data on observable labor market outcomes, household spending, and asset holdings.  Bribery is a 
social scourge in developing and transition countries.  However, available estimates of bribery 
are qualitative and subjective.  We show how one can obtain a simple and robust estimate of 
bribery from income, expenditures and asset holdings data.  Specifically, we use the 
compensating differential framework and the estimated sectoral gap in expenditures and reported 
earnings to identify the size of unobserved (unofficial) compensation (i.e., bribes) of public 
sector employees.  Using the conditions of labor market equilibrium, we offer a technique to 
calculate an aggregate measure of bribery in a country or a sector.  Since we make only a few 
assumptions, our method should be practically helpful in welfare calculations and designing 
policy to fight corruption in public institutions throughout the world.  
In the case of Ukraine, we find that public sector employees receive on average 24-32% 
less in monthly wages than their private sector counterparts and that the size of the wage gap 
does not diminish over time.  The gap remains large after controlling for a number of covariates 
and time-invariant unobservable worker characteristics.  We also find that the private-public 
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wage gap is positive at all percentiles of the conditional wage distribution, and it increases with 
worker productivity, reaching 67.5% in the 90th percentile of the wage distribution.  All of these 
empirical observations are consistent with pervasive bribery in Ukraine. 
We attribute the significant portion of the observed differences in reported earnings to 
bribes (20-27% of public sector wages).  Our analysis of household expenditures and asset 
holdings allows us to conclusively rule out theories that lower wages of public worker employees 
are offset by non-pecuniary characteristics of a public sector job such as efforts, fringe benefits, 
job satisfaction, job security, etc.  We strengthen our analysis by examining a better 
counterfactual (SOEs) for the public sector.  We find that large sectoral differences in wages are 
not translated into comparable differences in the levels of consumer expenditures and wealth as 
employees in the public and private sectors enjoy similar levels of consumption.   
Using a no-arbitrage argument, we develop an aggregate measure of bribery and find that 
the lower bound estimate of the extent of bribery in Ukraine is between 460 million and 580 
million U.S. dollars, which is equivalent to 0.9-1.2% of Ukraine’s GDP and 3.8-4.8% of the 
official wage bill in 2003.  Hence, at least 1% of GDP should be allocated to ensuring fair wages 
in the public sector.  However, the net cost of raising wages in the public sector can be smaller 
than 1% of GDP because less corrupt governments are likely to accelerate economic growth.  
Given that the wage gap is particularly large at the top of the wage distribution, the 
decompression of wages in the public sector might be a necessary prescription for reducing 
corruption at the top levels.  
We believe that combining expenditures/asset and income data is a fruitful avenue in the 
analysis of the private-public wage differentials.  Since household budget surveys are available 
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for many countries, our analysis can be easily replicated in other transition and developing 
countries where bribery is present. 
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Table 1:  Unadjusted Private-Public Wage Gap by Gender and Year, Log Difference 
 1991 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
All workers 
SOE 0.201*** 0.181*** 0.207*** 0.215*** 0.236*** 0.262*** 0.270*** 0.286***
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) 
Private 0.540*** 0.307*** 0.328*** 0.332*** 0.354*** 0.339*** 0.338*** 0.304***
 (0.081) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) 
N 2,893 2,452 2,320 2,379 2,453 2,556 2,793 2,786 
 
Males 
SOE 0.158*** 0.110* 0.060 0.074 0.155*** 0.160*** 0.177*** 0.233***
 (0.051) (0.056) (0.061) (0.056) (0.058) (0.057) (0.056) (0.054) 
Private 0.328** 0.202*** 0.158** 0.154** 0.204*** 0.179*** 0.143** 0.128** 
 (0.132) (0.069) (0.072) (0.066) (0.066) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) 
 
Females 
SOE 0.092*** 0.068** 0.110*** 0.132*** 0.119*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.141***
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) 
Private 0.481*** 0.194*** 0.233*** 0.250*** 0.265*** 0.252*** 0.288*** 0.262***
 (0.110) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.031) 
 
Notes:  The table reports the mean differences in log of monthly wages between the sectors, the standard errors of the 
mean differences (in parentheses), and the statistical significance of the t-test on the equality of means (* significant at 




Table 2: Adjusted Private-Public Wage Gap by Gender and Year, OLS Estimates 
 
 1991 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
All workers 
SOE 0.076*** 0.110*** 0.123*** 0.139*** 0.159*** 0.180*** 0.169*** 0.181***
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) 
Private 0.482*** 0.218*** 0.243*** 0.253*** 0.278*** 0.268*** 0.256*** 0.236***
 (0.124) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) 
N 2,893 2,452 2,320 2,379 2,453 2,556 2,793 2,786 
 
Males 
SOE 0.080* 0.132** 0.105 0.103* 0.166*** 0.162*** 0.154*** 0.196*** 
 (0.045) (0.059) (0.067) (0.060) (0.064) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054) 
Private 0.467*** 0.214*** 0.181** 0.174*** 0.213*** 0.205*** 0.173*** 0.165*** 
 (0.148) (0.067) (0.071) (0.064) (0.067) (0.055) (0.052) (0.054) 
 
Females 
SOE 0.091*** 0.117*** 0.134*** 0.149*** 0.141*** 0.178*** 0.165*** 0.155***
 (0.025) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.025) 
Private 0.565*** 0.257*** 0.300*** 0.303*** 0.332*** 0.312*** 0.326*** 0.316***
 (0.209) (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.028) 
 
Notes:  Reported are the estimated log wage effects of the non-public types of firms relative to public firms.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The estimates 
are obtained from the wage function specified in equation (1) and which includes years of schooling, a gender 
dummy, experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, a dummy for full-time job, 7 categories of firm size, 
and 5 regional groups.  Dependent variable is log of monthly contractual wages after taxes at the primary job.  
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Table 3: Adjusted Private-Public Wage Gap by Gender, Panel Estimates, 1997-2003 
Panel A: Time-Invarying Wage Gap 
 All workers Males Females 
 OLS(1) OLS(2) FE OLS(1) OLS(2) FE OLS(1) OLS(2) FE 
SOE 0.153*** 0.160*** 0.125*** 0.148*** 0.155*** 0.165*** 0.150*** 0.156*** 0.087* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.037) (0.022) (0.022) (0.058) (0.011) (0.011) (0.047) 
Private 0.249*** 0.258*** 0.214*** 0.186*** 0.205*** 0.226*** 0.310*** 0.309*** 0.204*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.038) (0.023) (0.023) (0.058) (0.013) (0.013) (0.050) 
N 17,739 16,867 17,739 8,067 7,832 8,067 9,672 9,035 9,672 
R2 0.316 0.326 0.331 0.202 0.220 0.311 0.292 0.309 0.360 
F(αi=0) … … 12.69 … … 13.44 … … 11.50 
 
Panel B: Time-Varying Wage Gap 
 All workers Males Females 
 OLS(1) OLS(2) FE OLS(1) OLS(2) FE OLS(1) OLS(2) FE 
SOE 0.127*** 0.136*** 0.130*** 0.118*** 0.124*** 0.172*** 0.127*** 0.137*** 0.092* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.061) (0.021) (0.022) (0.048) 
Private 0.261*** 0.267*** 0.223*** 0.227*** 0.238*** 0.249*** 0.279*** 0.279*** 0.199***
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.040) (0.044) (0.043) (0.063) (0.025) (0.025) (0.053) 
SOE*t 0.009* 0.008* -0.002 0.010 0.011 -0.003 0.007 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Private*t -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.012 -0.010 -0.008 0.010 0.009 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
N 17,739 16,867 17,739 8,067 7,832 8,067 9,672 9,035 9,672 
R2 0.316 0.326 0.331 0.203 0.220 0.311 0.292 0.309 0.360 
 
Panel C: Alternative Specifications 
 All workers Males Females 
 RE FD IT RE FD IT RE FD IT 
SOE 0.143*** 0.164** 0.165** 0.166*** 0.226** 0.222* 0.124*** 0.130 0.144 
 (0.018) (0.067) (0.075) (0.033) (0.109) (0.118) (0.021) (0.081) (0.090) 
Private 0.241*** 0.270*** 0.279*** 0.227*** 0.314*** 0.310*** 0.267*** 0.253*** 0.281***
 (0.019) (0.068) (0.076) (0.034) (0.108) (0.116) (0.023) (0.086) (0.094) 
N 17,739 13,032 13,032 8,067 5,870 5,870 9,672 7,162 7,162 
R2 0.328 0.034 0.036 0.307 0.048 0.049 0.355 0.030 0.035 
F(αi’=0) … … 0.93 … … 0.98 … … 0.89 
 
Notes:  Reported are the estimated log wage effects of the non-public types of firms relative to public firms for the 1997-2003 
pooled data.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The 
OLS specification (1) includes years of schooling, a gender dummy, experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, a 
dummy for full-time job, 7 categories of firm size, 5 regional groups, and 7 year dummies.  The OLS specification (2) also 
includes marital status, number of children and parents’ background such as years of schooling and occupation of both 
parents.  FE – fixed effects estimator, RE – random effects estimator, FD – first differencing estimator, and IT – individual 
trend estimator.  The FE, RE, FD, and IT specifications includes all time-varying variables from the specification (1) such as 
years of schooling, experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, a dummy for full-time job, 7 categories of firm 
size, and 7 year dummies.  t is the time trend.  Dependent variable is log of monthly contractual wages after taxes at the 
primary job. 
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Table 4: Annual Rates of Entry to and Exit from the Public Sector, % 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 
A. Entry Rates 
Males 
SOE … 1.13 1.14 5.33 0.61 2.38 0.63 
Private … 1.69 1.14 1.78 1.82 0.60 1.27 
Other sector … 0.56 2.29 0.00 1.82 1.79 0.00 
Non-employment … 3.95 6.86 1.78 6.06 5.95 2.53 
 
Females 
SOE … 1.21 0.18 0.73 1.10 0.76 0.39 
Private … 0.52 0.53 0.73 1.10 0.76 0.00 
Other sector … 0.35 0.70 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 
Non-employment … 4.33 4.40 5.46 3.87 5.50 1.58 
 
B. Exit Rates 
Males 
SOE 1.57 0.56 1.71 1.18 3.03 1.19 … 
Private 3.66 3.39 6.86 2.37 1.82 1.19 … 
Other sector 1.05 1.69 1.14 1.18 0.61 0.00 … 
Non-employment 4.19 5.65 1.14 5.33 1.82 5.95 … 
 
Females 
SOE 0.52 0.69 0.88 0.36 1.47 0.00 … 
Private 1.21 0.87 2.29 0.91 1.47 0.57 … 
Other sector 0.52 0.17 0.35 0.91 0.74 0.19 … 
Non-employment 2.94 5.36 5.11 4.20 5.16 4.17 … 
 
Notes:  Entry rate is the percentage share of the employed in the public sector at the end of year t who 
entered the public sector in year t from the corresponding sector.  Exit rate is the percentage share of the 
employed in the public sector at the end of year t who moved to the corresponding sector in year t+1.  
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Table 5: Sensitivity of the Private-Public Wage Gap Estimates, 2003 
 
 SOE-Public Private-Public 
Specification All 
workers Males Females 
All 
workers Males Females 
LHS – log(monthly wages)   0.196*** 0.198*** 0.174*** 0.287*** 0.208*** 0.367*** 
 (0.023) (0.054) (0.024) (0.024) (0.053) (0.027) 
RHS – with union dummy 0.190*** 0.191*** 0.173*** 0.262*** 0.174*** 0.353*** 
   (0.023) (0.054) (0.024) (0.026) (0.054) (0.028) 
LHS – log(hourly wages) 0.160*** 0.163*** 0.147*** 0.193*** 0.137*** 0.261*** 
 (0.023) (0.050) (0.026) (0.025) (0.050) (0.029) 
LHS – log(hourly wages) 0.161*** 0.170*** 0.141*** 0.204*** 0.149*** 0.270***
  (full-time employees) (0.024) (0.051) (0.026) (0.025) (0.051) (0.030) 
LHS – log(expected  0.153*** 0.157*** 0.139*** 0.178*** 0.123** 0.246*** 
  hourly wage) (0.023) (0.050) (0.026) (0.025) (0.050) (0.029) 
 
Notes:  N=2561 (2416 for full-time employees).  Reported are the estimated log wage effects of the non-public types of firms 
relative to public firms in five OLS specifications.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All five specifications include years of schooling, a gender dummy, experience, 
experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, a dummy for full-time job, 7 categories of firm size, and 5 regional groups.  The 
baseline estimates (in the first row) slightly differ from those in Table 3 because of the different sample sizes.  Specifically, 
we exclude respondents with missing observations on hours of work and also respondents earning less than two thirds of a 
minimum hourly wage (≈0.734 UAH). 
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Table 6: Incidence of Fringe Benefits by Sector and Gender, 2003 (percent) 
 
 Males Females 
 Public SOE Private Public SOE Private 
Regular paid vacation 96.32 94.56 69.32 97.88 95.50 64.12 
Paid sick leave 92.65 93.59 63.59 96.39 94.32 59.35 
Paid maternity leave and child care 
leave 77.21 66.60 44.36 88.11 79.84 48.85 
Free treatment in an enterprise 
polyclinic and other health subsidies 19.85 26.21 13.04 20.81 20.74 13.17 
Payment for travel to sanatoria, 
tourist bases, or children camps 22.79 32.82 14.31 26.11 29.55 14.69 
Free child care in an enterprise 
kindergarten and other formal child 
care subsidies 1.47 5.44 3.18 2.12 1.96 1.72 
Free food, discounted food, or food 
subsidies 2.94 5.44 3.02 0.85 1.96 4.20 
Transportation subsidies 4.41 12.04 3.97 3.40 9.00 4.01 
Enterprise-paid training  19.85 26.21 10.33 30.57 24.07 11.64 
Loans and credit 0.00 8.93 6.04 2.76 8.02 5.92 
Possibilities to rent/purchase garden 
and land plot at below market prices 1.47 6.21 2.07 1.91 4.31 4.20 
Equipment for additional earnings 
and private needs 0.00 0.78 0.64 0.21 0.00 0.19 
Housing subsidies 8.82 6.21 3.34 8.07 5.28 3.82 
No fringe benefits   2.94 2.33 22.73 1.27 2.74 30.15 
 
Note:  The table shows the percentage of workers reporting a given type of fringe benefit at their primary job.  
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Table 7: Job Separations by Sector and Year 
 
 1991 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 
A.  Quits 
Males 
Public 0.104 0.137 0.083 0.125 0.101 0.112 0.074 
SOE 0.105 0.127 0.104 0.119 0.091 0.112 0.042 
Private 0.214 0.144 0.101 0.134 0.105 0.116 0.067 
 
Females 
Public 0.092 0.090 0.081 0.073 0.083 0.069 0.024 
SOE 0.100 0.094 0.078 0.072 0.070 0.093 0.040 




Public 0.040 0.048 0.019 0.025 0.000 0.016 0.000 
SOE 0.042 0.048 0.046 0.045 0.028 0.064 0.010 
Private 0.000 0.054 0.042 0.028 0.036 0.052 0.024 
 
Females 
Public 0.012 0.015 0.024 0.021 0.018 0.019 0.004 
SOE 0.030 0.064 0.052 0.052 0.049 0.026 0.012 
Private 0.063 0.109 0.070 0.048 0.041 0.056 0.020 
 
Note:  The table shows the share of workers that quit their job or being laid off during the next year.  
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Table 8:  Determinants of the Probability of Separations, 1997-2003 
 
 Layoffs Quits 
SOE 0.029*** 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Private 0.034*** 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Schooling (years) -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Male -0.005 0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Potential experience (years) 0.000 -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Potential experience squared /1000 -0.011 0.222*** 
 (0.012) (0.018) 
Tenure (years) -0.001* -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Tenure squared /1000 0.018 0.110*** 
 (0.015) (0.024) 
Full-time job -0.018** 0.013 
 (0.007) (0.009) 
Firm size   
10-49 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
50-99 -0.005 -0.015* 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
100-499 -0.011** -0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) 
500-599 -0.007 -0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) 
1000+ -0.007 -0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
No information -0.001 0.026** 
 (0.006) (0.011) 
N 14,953 14,953 
 
Notes:  The reported marginal effects are obtained from the probit estimates.  The dependent variables are dummies 
indicating whether an individual is laid off (column 1) or quit (column 2) during the next year.  Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The omitted categories 
are public organizations and 1-9 employees (firm size).  Regional and year dummies are included in the probit 
estimates but not shown here.  
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Table 9:  Dispersion of Wages 
Panel A:  Dispersion of Wages by Year 
 1991 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 
Standard Deviation of Log of Monthly Wage 
Public 0.480 0.553 0.539 0.533 0.511 0.495 0.512 0.473 
SOE 0.539 0.602 0.574 0.551 0.572 0.567 0.584 0.570 
Private 0.829 0.651 0.633 0.634 0.633 0.609 0.636 0.610 
 
90-10 Wage Differentials 
Public 1.139 1.273 1.139 1.227 1.099 1.068 1.070 1.019 
SOE 1.358 1.322 1.358 1.308 1.310 1.427 1.357 1.386 
Private 1.792 1.609 1.492 1.609 1.526 1.466 1.455 1.386 
 
Panel B:  Dispersion of Wages in the Pooled Sample, 1997-2003 
 Standard Deviation of  
Log of Monthly Wage ΔWage Gap 
 Public SOE Private SOE-Public 
Private-
Public 
Variation in lnwit (raw data adjusted for inflation ) 
All 0.508 0.556 0.629 0.013 0.035 
Males 0.583 0.538 0.642 … 0.018 
Females 0.442 0.490 0.569 0.011 0.032 
Variation in conditional lnwit (OLS residuals) 
All 0.427 0.471 0.570 0.010 0.036 
Males 0.518 0.492 0.597 … 0.022 
Females 0.387 0.446 0.524 0.012 0.032 
Inter-temporal variation in conditional lnwit (FE residuals) 
All 0.259 0.303 0.281 0.006 0.003 
Males 0.273 0.317 0.284 0.007 0.002 
Females 0.255 0.289 0.277 0.005 0.003 
 
Notes: ΔWage gap=the change in the wage gap that compensates the differences in the dispersion of wages between 
the sectors (γ=1.5).  The dispersion of conditional log of monthly wage is computed on the basis of the OLS 
residuals obtained from Equation (1).  Inter-temporal variation on conditional log wage is approximated by the 
standard deviation of residuals estimated from Equation (2), with individual and year fixed effects included.   
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Table 10:  Job Satisfaction, Bonuses, and Multiple Job Holding, 2003 
 
Dependent  Coeff. (Std. Err.) Mean 
Variables: SOE Private (Std.Dev.) 
R2 or 
Pseudo R2 N 
Job satisfaction  0.171*** -0.057 3.333 0.014 2766 
/Ordered Probit/ (0.058) (0.059) (1.216)   
Bonus: 13th salary 0.064*** -0.020 0.106 0.144 2773 
/Probit/ (0.017) (0.015)    
Bonus: performance-based 0.080*** -0.003 0.262 0.042 2773 
/Probit/ (0.024) (0.024)    
Bonus for work conditions 0.016 -0.018* 0.051 0.082 2773 
/Probit/ (0.011) (0.010)    
Bonus: profit sharing 0.011 0.015** 0.011 0.095 2608 
/Probit/ (0.007) (0.007)    
Bonus: other compensation 0.004 -0.011 0.043 0.048 2773 
/Probit/ (0.009) (0.009)    
No bonuses last year -0.100*** 0.041 0.629 0.063 2773 
/Probit/ (0.027) (0.027)    
Had a secondary job -0.006 -0.000 0.023 0.064 2785 
/Probit/ (0.006) (0.006)    
Wage from primary and  0.196*** 0.236*** 5.520 0.250 2784 
secondary jobs /OLS/ (0.029) (0.031) (0.642)   
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Marginal effects are reported for probit estimates.  All ten equations include years of schooling, a gender dummy, 
experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, a dummy for full-time job, 7 categories of firm size, and 5 
regional groups.  The omitted category is public organizations.  Job satisfaction is defined on a scale from 1 (fully 
unsatisfied) to 5 (fully satisfied).  
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Table 11:  Household Reported Earnings, 2003 
 
 Contractual Wage Actual Wage
Total 
Earnings 
Mean (depvar) 420.4 414.5 476.8 
St.dev.(depvar) (313.9) (317.3) (395.5) 
Units UAH UAH UAH 
Reference period month month month 
 OLS OLS OLS 
No. of HH earners in    
SOEs 0.121*** 0.104*** 0.120*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.029) 
Private sector 0.169*** 0.166*** 0.171*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.031) 
Other sectors -0.003 -0.002 -0.037 
 (0.036) (0.041) (0.053) 
No. of HH earners 0.542*** 0.521*** 0.250*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.031) 
No. of HH members  -0.023*** -0.022** 0.064*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
N 2271 2179 2080 
 
Notes:  Household is the unit of observation.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  To reduce the influence of outliers in earnings and consumption functions, 
the OLS is performed as a Huber robust regression, with lower weights given to influential observations.  All 
earnings measures are used in logarithmic form.  HH denotes household. All specifications include additional 




Table 12: Household Expenditures and Wealth, 2003 
 
In Household Current Possession 





durables Durables Computer Phone Cell Car 
Mean (depvar) 87.0 178.3 276.4 622.4 317.4 0.074 0.526 0.090 0.239 
St.dev.(depvar) (82.6) (579.6) (621.2) (765.0) (2154.8)     
Units UAH UAH UAH UAH UAH share Share share share 
Reference period week month month month year     
 OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
No. of HH earners in          
SOEs 0.038 0.017 0.024 0.028 0.177 0.005 -0.023 0.008 -0.027 
 (0.036) (0.052) (0.052) (0.036) (0.976) (0.010) (0.024) (0.012) (0.019) 
Private sector 0.062* 0.076 0.084 0.069* -0.117 0.023** -0.011 0.017 -0.019 
 (0.038) (0.055) (0.055) (0.038) (1.029) (0.010) (0.025) (0.012) (0.020) 
Other sectors -0.143** -0.129 -0.174* -0.174*** 1.413 0.010 -0.106*** 0.015 -0.034 
 (0.061) (0.090) (0.089) (0.061) (1.588) (0.017) (0.040) (0.020) (0.032) 
No. of HH earners 0.078** 0.138** 0.145*** 0.102*** -1.101 -0.000 0.041 -0.006 0.020 
 (0.038) (0.055) (0.055) (0.038) (1.035) (0.010) (0.025) (0.013) (0.020) 
No. of HH members  0.089*** 0.129*** 0.120*** 0.100*** 0.101 0.007** 0.022** 0.001 0.047***
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.361) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.007) 
N 2,040 2,033 2,065 1,980 2,233 2,263 2,268 2,262 2,268 
 
Notes:  Household is the unit of observation.  Except for tobit, robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  Marginal effects are reported for probit estimates.  To reduce the influence of outliers in earnings and consumption functions, the OLS is 
performed as a Huber robust regression, with lower weights given to influential observations.  All expenditures measures are used in logarithmic form.  HH 
denotes household. All specifications include individual covariates from Equation (1) that are averaged for household wage earners.  Zero values for durables are 
replaced by 1. 
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Table 13:  Estimates of Bribery in the Public Sector, 2003 
 
Aggregate Bribery 
Method Wage Gap Estimate mln UAH % of GDP % of Wage Bill 
SOE vs. Public 
Unconditional monthly wage, 2003 0.286 4,132 1.56 6.36 
OLS, monthly wage, 1997-2003 0.153 2,063 0.78 3.18 
Fixed effect, monthly wage, 1997-2003 0.125 1,662 0.63 2.56 
Individual-specific trend, monthly wage, 1997-2003 0.165 2,239 0.85 3.45 
OLS, hourly wage, 2003 0.160 2,165 0.82 3.33 
OLS, expected hourly wage, 2003 0.153 2,063 0.78 3.18 
Quantile regression, hourly wage, 2003 0.185 2,542 0.96 3.91 
Quantile regression, expected hourly wage, 2003 0.178 2,438 0.92 3.75 
     
Private vs. Public 
Unconditional monthly wage, 2003 0.304 4,434 1.68 6.82 
OLS, monthly wage, 1997-2003 0.249 3,528 1.34 5.43 
Fixed effect, monthly wage, 1997-2003 0.214 2,978 1.13 4.58 
Individual-specific trend, monthly wage, 1997-2003 0.279 4,016 1.52 6.18 
OLS, hourly wage, 2003 0.193 2,657 1.01 4.09 
OLS, expected hourly wage, 2003 0.178 2,431 0.92 3.74 
Quantile regression, hourly wage, 2003 0.238 3,346 1.27 5.15 
Quantile regression, expected hourly wage, 2003 0.221 3,094 1.17 4.76 
 
Notes:  The amount of bribes is computed according to the methodology described in Section 6.  In addition to the 
estimated wage gap, we also use the following data for 2003: GDP=264,165 million UAH; Nb= 3,741 million 
people, average before-tax monthly wage of the public sector employee =351 UAH; total wage bill = 64,966 mln 
UAH, effective income tax rate=20.8% (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2003).  The wage gap estimate for 
quantile regressions is a weighted average across percentiles, with conditional hourly wage rate used as a weight. 
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Figure 2:  Counterfactual Private-Public Wage Gap by Gender, 1997-2003 









































Notes:  Counterfactual 1 = how much would the private sector employee gain (lose) if he/she were 
to move to the public sector.  Counterfactual 2 = how much would the public sector employee gain 
(lose) if he/she were to move to the private sector.  Counterfactual 3 = the estimated wage 
differences between the private sector employees and the public sector employee if he/she had βs 
from the private sector.  
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Notes:  Counterfactual 1 = how much does the SOE employee would gain (lose) if he/she were to 
move to the public sector.  Counterfactual 2 = how much does the public sector employee would 
gain (lose) if he/she were to move to the SOE.  Counterfactual 3 = the estimated wage differences 
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Note:  Expected wage is computed as actual wage multiplied by one minus the predicted probability of being fired.  
 
 53
Appendix Table A1:  Definitions of Variables 
Variable Description 
Wage Monthly contractual wage after taxes at the primary job in December of the 
corresponding year. All wages are converted into hryvnyas.   
Adjusted years of 
schooling 
Education status from the survey has been converted into a continuous variable 
representing adjusted years of schooling.  Adjusted years of schooling were taken as 4 
for 1-6 grades, 8 for 7-9 grades, 10 for 10-12 secondary school grades, 9 for a 
vocational non-secondary school diploma, 11.5 for a vocational secondary school 
diploma, 13 for a technical school diploma and incomplete higher education, 14 for a 
bachelor degree, 15 for a diploma of specialist, 16 for a master degree, and 18 for a 
Ph.D. degree.  Educational histories are used to compute adjusted years of schooling 
for previous years.  Same definitions are used to compute adjusted years of schooling 
of parents.   
Female =1 if female 
Potential labor 
market experience 
Age minus years of schooling minus 6 
Tenure Number of years since an individual started the primary job 
Full-time job =1 if worked full time throughout a given year 
Weekly hours of 
work 
2003:  hours per week an individual usually works at the primary job; not available for 
other years 
Public =1 if primary employer is a budgetary organization 
SOE =1 if primary employer is a state enterprise or a local municipal enterprise 
Private  =1 if primary employer is a privatized enterprise, a newly established private 
enterprise; or a foreign company 
Firm size Number of persons working at enterprise (workplace for self-employed) of primary 
job:  1-9, 10-49, 50-99, 100-499, 500-999, 1000+, and no information.  
Regions 5 regional dummies: Eastern, Southern, Western, Central and Northern, and Kyiv city 
Parents’ occupation 10 occupational categories, 1-digit ISCO-88 
Marital status =1 if married 
Number of children  Number of children less than 18 years old 
Union 2003: =1 if belongs to a trade union at the primary job; not available for other years 
Fringe benefits 2003: 14 categorical variables for various types of fringe benefits at the primary job; 
not available for other years 
Job separations Two dummies indicating whether an individual is laid off or quit during the next year 
Job satisfaction Categorical variable that ranges from 1 (fully unsatisfied) to 5 (fully satisfied) 
Bonuses Several dummies indicating whether an employee received the following types of 
bonuses last year: 13th salary, performance-based bonus, bonus for work conditions, 
profit sharing, or other bonuses 
Secondary job = 1 if had a secondary job during the reference week 
Non-durables Last month expenditures on food, beverages, tobacco, apparel, and services (including 
transportation, health care, education, and entertainment) 
Durables Last year expenditures on furniture, refrigerator, washer/dryer, car, truck, motorcycle, 
summer house, plot, and house/apartment 
Assets Four dummy variables indicating whether a household possesses a car, a phone, a cell 
phone, or a computer 
Household 
earnings 
After tax total earnings in the form of money, goods, and services received last month 
by all household members from their primary and secondary jobs 
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Table A2: The Share of Total Employment by Sector and Gender 
 
 1991 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
All workers 
Public 0.191 0.209 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.213 0.215 0.218 
SOE 0.796 0.535 0.494 0.461 0.416 0.385 0.366 0.368 
Private 0.013 0.256 0.296 0.328 0.373 0.402 0.419 0.414 
N 2893 2452 2320 2379 2453 2556 2793 2786 
Males 
Public 0.099 0.113 0.105 0.111 0.107 0.107 0.105 0.106 
SOE 0.881 0.583 0.548 0.497 0.445 0.413 0.388 0.402 
Private 0.021 0.304 0.347 0.392 0.448 0.480 0.508 0.491 
Females 
Public 0.244 0.287 0.296 0.294 0.296 0.302 0.310 0.313 
SOE 0.747 0.496 0.450 0.431 0.392 0.362 0.347 0.339 
Private 0.009 0.217 0.255 0.275 0.312 0.336 0.343 0.348 
 
Note:  Sample weights are applied for 1991. 
 
Table A3: Summary statistics, 2003 
 
 Males Females 
 Public SOE Private Public SOE Private 
Schooling (adjusted years) 14.032 12.450 12.267 13.580 12.710 12.653 
 (3.257) (2.345) (2.349) (2.393) (2.439) (2.407) 
Experience (years) 21.836 21.067 19.431 21.031 23.603 19.597 
 (10.936) (10.968) (11.665) (10.452) (10.386) (10.603) 
Tenure (years) 8.971 9.825 7.359 11.571 12.515 8.183 
 (8.488) (9.194) (8.942) (9.219) (10.082) (9.470) 
Average hours per week 41.130 41.810 44.198 37.495 39.234 44.839 
 (10.824) (8.703) (10.556) (9.361) (9.151) (13.306) 
Full-time job 0.971 0.973 0.952 0.909 0.916 0.941 
Union participation 0.738 0.808 0.476 0.919 0.859 0.468 
Firm size (no. of persons)       
1-9 0.044 0.029 0.115 0.076 0.092 0.242 
10-49 0.272 0.128 0.229 0.312 0.235 0.239 
50-99 0.177 0.126 0.115 0.223 0.125 0.095 
Size is missing 0.110 0.085 0.110 0.062 0.076 0.076 
100-499 0.243 0.268 0.204 0.223 0.217 0.158 
500-999 0.066 0.076 0.064 0.045 0.069 0.071 
1000+ 0.088 0.287 0.165 0.059 0.186 0.118 
Regions -  East 0.243 0.408 0.377 0.282 0.362 0.387 
South 0.206 0.130 0.142 0.142 0.141 0.143 
West 0.368 0.218 0.229 0.316 0.260 0.197 
Center & North 0.147 0.186 0.180 0.193 0.166 0.178 
Kyiv city 0.037 0.058 0.073 0.066 0.071 0.095 
N 136 515 629 471 511 524 
 
Note:  Standard deviation for continuous variables is in parentheses.
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Table A4: Sensitivity of Private-Public Wage Gap Estimates to Weak Exclusion 
Restrictions  
 
Panel A: Two-Step Heckman (1979) Method for Selectivity Correction 
 SOE-Public Private-Public 
 All 
workers Males Females 
All 
workers Males Females 
Time-Varying Exclusion Restrictions, 1997-2003 pooled data 
Age and age squared -0.687 -1.067 3.351 -0.087 0.099 4.616 
 (0.703) (0.841) (4.094) (0.402) (0.615) (3.309) 
Level of education -0.229*** -0.179** -0.106 -0.133** -0.420*** 0.347*** 
 (0.053) (0.083) (0.073) (0.058) (0.094) (0.062) 
No. of children ever born -10.999 0.591 -0.664** 0.460*** 0.412* 0.708*** 
 (46.104) (0.666) (0.334) (0.121) (0.239) (0.177) 
No. of children < 18 years 0.598* -0.765* 1.457** 0.539*** -0.021 0.891*** 
 (0.360) (0.461) (0.648) (0.179) (0.248) (0.296) 
Marital status 0.000 -2.012*** 3.479 0.121 -0.751*** 0.515*** 
 (0.000) (0.713) (17.515) (0.116) (0.221) (0.105) 
Time-Invariant Exclusion Restrictions, 2003 data 
Total household income 0.946 -27.822 0.781** 3.821 2.480 0.677 
 (0.961) (689.330) (0.325) (6.361) (2.449) (0.884) 
Industry in 1991 0.308*** 0.498*** 0.200** 0.238*** 0.169 0.243***
 (0.074) (0.137) (0.089) (0.064) (0.146) (0.068) 
Parents’ occupation 0.023 0.225 0.221 -0.072 0.215 0.235 
 (0.140) (0.161) (0.140) (0.213) (0.232) (0.188) 
 
Panel B: Maximum Likelihood Treatment Regression Estimates 
 SOE-Public Private-Public 
 All 
workers Males Females 
All 
workers Males Females 
Time-Varying Exclusion Restrictions, 1997-2003 pooled data 
Age and age squared -0.246*** 0.102 0.619*** -0.399*** 0.063 0.459*** 
 (0.063) (0.117) (0.038) (0.036) (0.243) (0.157) 
Level of education -0.257*** -0.061 -0.376*** -0.325*** -0.282*** 0.356*** 
 (0.037) (0.059) (0.033) (0.037) (0.060) (0.066) 
No. of children ever born -0.256*** 0.144 -0.402*** 0.940*** 0.810*** 0.542*** 
 (0.061) (0.134) (0.034) (0.032) (0.079) (0.114) 
No. of children < 18 years 0.728*** 0.061 0.631*** 0.949*** 0.018 0.514*** 
 (0.027) (0.102) (0.036) (0.032) (0.158) (0.141) 
Marital status -0.050*** -0.017 0.615*** -0.393*** -0.221*** 0.478*** 
 (0.011) (0.090) (0.040) (0.038) (0.086) (0.087) 
Time-Invariant Exclusion Restrictions, 2003 data 
Total household income 0.687*** 0.174 0.508*** 0.976*** 0.610*** 0.840***
 (0.087) (0.365) (0.104) (0.070) (0.231) (0.106) 
Industry in 1991 0.446*** 0.524*** 0.227** 0.236*** 0.180 0.246***
 (0.096) (0.127) (0.112) (0.071) (0.173) (0.067) 
Parents’ occupation -0.434*** 0.242 0.484*** -0.485*** 0.451 -0.316***
 (0.074) (0.203) (0.148) (0.061) (0.341) (0.074) 
 
Notes:  N=2,561.  Reported are the estimated log wage effects of the non-public types of firms relative to public firms from 
treatment regressions, with alternative exclusion restrictions.  Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All specifications include years of schooling, a gender dummy, experience, 
experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, a dummy for full-time job, 7 categories of firm size, and 5 regional groups.   
